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We focus on a class of Multiple Prior Models. Those characterized by
nonatomic countably additive priors. Preferences generating such repre-
sentations have been recently axiomatized in [17]. We argue that this is
the proper setting for comparing the notions of unambiguous event given
by Epstein and Zhang in [7] and by Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Mari-
nacci in [10]. The two definitions are known to be nonequivalent. Our
main result is that an event T is unambiguous in the sense of Epstein and
Zhang if and only if either (i) it is unambiguous in the sense of [10]; or
(ii) conditional on T , the decision maker is an expected utility maximizer.
We also provide an easy operational criterion for establishing whether or
not an event is unambiguous in the sense of Epstein and Zhang.
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1 Introduction
Since the fundamental work of Gilboa and Schmeidler [13], Multiple Prior mod-
els have become the object of a thorough investigation among decision theorists
(see, for instance [5], [10], [11], [15], [16]). Moreover, an increasing number of pa-
pers have made use of such models to address, in a novel way, issues in Finance,
Macroeconomics and Political Economy ([6], [9], [14]). Several reasons explain
this trend. At one end of the spectrum, a recent result of Ghirardato, Mac-
cheroni and Marinacci [10] shows that a very general model of decision making
under uncertainty takes the form of a Multiple Prior model. At the other end,
we find what originally motivated the work of Gilboa and Schmeidler. Multiple
∗I am grateful to Larry Epstein, Emel Filiz, Paolo Ghirardato, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo
Marinacci and Marco Scarsini for comments and suggestions.
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Prior models deliver a distinction of the uncertainty faced by the decision maker
into two parts: Ambiguity and Risk. Hence, they leave room to accommodate
phenomena like hedging and Ellsberg’s choices.
The ability of dealing with Ambiguity is one of the most distinguishing fea-
tures between Multiple Prior models and the Savage-de Finetti theory. Proba-
bly motivated by this observation, a number of papers have abstracted from the
Multiple Prior model itself and have focused directly on the idea of Ambiguity.
This has given rise to several nonequivalent definitions of ambiguous event (see
[7] and [12] for thorough discussions). Here, we single out two. Roughly speak-
ing, for [10] an event A is ambiguous if a bet on A is suitable of more than one
evaluation. While for [7], A is ambiguous if bets involving A are associated to
Ellsberg’s choices.
In this paper, we focus on a class of preferences satisfying the α-maxmin
criterion. Specifically, those identified by the properties that all the priors in
the representation are (a) countably additive and (b) nonatomic. A number
of reasons motivate these restrictions. It is well-known that countable additiv-
ity produces remarkable properties both from a mathematical viewpoint and a
decision-theoretic one. For the latter, the reader is referred to [3] and [18]. As
for the nonatomicity of the measures, this is a property that is often imposed in
conventional subjective expected utility theory. It occurs, for instance, in Sav-
age. Besides these virtues, here we have yet another reason for using countable
additivity in the place of finite additivity as well as for imposing the nonatomic-
ity of the measures. The Epstein-Zhang axioms produce a countably additive
nonatomic measure on the class of unambiguous sets. Elsewhere [2], we showed
that the Ghirardato-Maccheroni-Marinacci definition produces such properties
if and only if all the priors in the representation are both countably additive
and nonatomic. Hence, the class of preferences we deal with appears to be the
proper ground for comparing the two definition of ambiguous events.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is a brief description of the results
contained in [17], which characterize the class of preferences we study. This
section serves only to make the paper self-contained. Reader familiar with [17]
should certainly skip it. Section 3 reports the two definitions of ambiguous
events we study and introduces some terminology we use in the rest of the
paper. Section 4 contains our results. There, we provide necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for an event to be unambiguous in the sense of Epstein and Zhang
[7]. For an α-maxmin decision maker, we show that an event T is unambiguous
in the sense of Epstein and Zhang if either (i) it is unambiguous in the sense of
Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [10]; or (ii) conditional on T , the decision
maker is an expected utility maximizer. Moreover, Corollary 12 provides an easy
operational criterion which permits to establish whether or not a given event
T is Epstein-Zhang ambiguous for an α-maxmin decision maker. An Appendix
containing the proofs of the various statements completes the paper.
2
2 Monotone continuous, countably additive mul-
tiple priors
The setting we are going to focus on is defined by three objects. First, a collec-
tion, F (S,Φ), of mappings S → Φ, which represent the alternatives available to
the decision maker. S is called the state space and Φ the prize space. Second, a
fixed σ-field, Σ, of subsets of S. Third, a preference relation, %, on F (S,Φ). Let
B(Σ) denote the set of bounded, Σ-measurable functions. Then, the preference
relation % is said to satisfy the α-maxmin criterion if and only if there exists a
functional I : B(Σ)→ R such that for a, b ∈ F (S,Φ)
a % b iff I(u ◦ a) ≥ I(u ◦ b)
where u : Φ→ R is a utility function on the prize space, and for every h ∈ B(Σ),










with F being a set of probability measures on (S,Σ), and α ∈ [0, 1].
Preferences satisfying such a criterion have been recently axiomatized in [10]
and in [15]. In [17], it has been shown that whenever such preferences satisfy two
additional axioms, namely % is (a) both upward and downward atomless and
(b) satisfies the axiom of monotone continuity (see [17]), then all the measures
in F are (i) nonatomic; (ii) countably additive; and (iii) there exists a measure
ν ∈ ∆(S) such that all the measures in F are absolutely continuous with respect
to ν.
3 Ambiguous events
In this section we report the definitions of ambiguous events given by Ghi-
rardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [10] and by Epstein and Zhang [7], and col-
lect some facts about the classes of unambiguous events determined by the two
definitions. In addition, we introduce some terminology that we use throughout
the paper.
Let F be the set of priors as in the previous section. Generic elements in
F are denoted by Pf , Pg, etc.. All subsets of S which appear in the definitions
below are elements of the given σ-algebra, Σ, of subsets of S.
Definition 1 (Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [10]) A set T ⊆
S is unambiguous if and only if Pf (T ) = Pg(T ) for all Pf , Pg ∈ F.
Note that if T is unambiguous according to this definition, so is its comple-
ment T c.
The class of unambiguous events according to Ghirardato, Maccheroni and
Marinacci [10] is a λ-system. The dependence of such a class on the set of priors
is studied in [2]. There, it is also shown that there is a natural measure defined
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on the class of unambiguous events and that, whenever the class is nontrivial,
the natural measure is nonatomic.
Throughout the paper, we refer to events which are unambiguous in the sense
of Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [10] as F-measurable events. This
terminology was introduced in [2], and motivated by the concepts developed
there. Here, its virtue is that it would avoid some possible confusion between
the two concepts of ambiguity we study.
The Epstein and Zhang [7] definition is sensibly diﬀerent from the Ghirardato-
Maccheroni-Marinacci’s one. In fact, it is well-known that the two are not
equivalent (see [7] and the next section). The Epstein-Zhang’s definition, be-
ing formulated directly in terms of preferences, is independent of the particular
model one is using. As a notable consequence, this allows one to ascertain the
ambiguous/unambiguous nature of an event in any model.
Definition 2 (Epstein and Zhang [7]) An event T is unambiguous if: (a)
for all disjoint subevents A,B of T , acts h and outcomes y∗, y, z, z0


y∗ if s ∈ A
y if s ∈ B
h(s) if s ∈ T \ (A ∪B)





y if s ∈ A
y∗ if s ∈ B
h(s) if s ∈ T \ (A ∪B)





y∗ if s ∈ A
y if s ∈ B
h(s) if s ∈ T \ (A ∪B)





y if s ∈ A
y∗ if s ∈ B
h(s) if s ∈ T \ (A ∪B)
z0 if s ∈ T c


and (b) The condition obtained if T c is everywhere replaced by T in (a) is also
satisfied. Otherwise, T is ambiguous.
Just like in the Ghirardato-Maccheroni-Marinacci’s case, the class of unam-
biguous events in the sense of Epstein and Zhang is a λ-system. Moreover, their
axioms (see [7]) guarantee that such a class is nontrivial and that there exists a
countably additive nonatomic measure defined on it.
In what follows, we are going to be using a definition of unambiguous events
which is more permissive than the Epstein-Zhang’s in that we drop the part (b)
of the definition above. We do so because the following developments suggest
that the more permissive definition has its own value. Below, we give necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for an event to be unambiguous according to the more
permissive definition.1 However, as (obviously) our statements refer to an arbi-
trary event T , it suﬃces to require that the same conditions be satisfied both for
T and T c (the complement of T ) to get back to the full Epstein-Zhang’s setting.
Because of this trivial observation, we call Epstein-Zhang’s unambiguous also
those events which satisfy only part (a) of the Epstein-Zhang’s definition.
1Observe that, obviously, if T is ambiguous according to the more permissive definition,
then T is ambiguous for Epstein-Zhang.
4
4 Results
In this section, within the context of the model of Section 2, we are going to
study the relation between the two concepts of ambiguity described above.
We begin by establishing that if a decision maker satisfies the assumptions
of Section 2, and (relative to such a decision maker) an event T ⊂ S is F-
measurable (i.e., unambiguous for Ghirardato-Maccheroni-Marinacci), then T
is unambiguous in the sense of Epstein and Zhang (EZ-unambiguous, for short).
This is the content of Proposition 3 and Corollary 4 below.
Proposition 3 Let % be a preference relation on F (S,Φ) satisfying the as-
sumptions of Section 2 for α = 1, and let T ∈ Σ. If T is F-measurable (= un-
ambiguous for Ghirardato-Maccheroni-Marinacci), then T is EZ-unambiguous.
A quick look at the proof of Proposition 3 delivers, at once, the following
Corollary 4 If a preference relation on F (S,Φ) satisfies the assumptions of
Section 2 for α ∈ [0, 1], then T F-measurable implies T EZ-unambiguous.
In general, the converse to Proposition 3 does not hold. Both Epstein [4]
and Ghirardato [8] have exhibited examples of decision makers for whom every
set A ∈ Σ is unambiguous in the sense of Epstein-Zhang, but the set of priors is
not a singleton. The next proposition provides an example of this sort for our
setting. That is, it exhibits a maxmin decision maker and a set T ∈ Σ which is
EZ-unambiguous but not F-measurable.
Proposition 5 Let d be a maxmin decision maker (α = 1) with F = co {Pf , Pg}
(co denotes the convex hull). Let Pf , Pg and T ∈ Σ be such that
(a) Pf (T ) > 0; Pg(T ) > 0;
(b) Pf (T ) 6= Pg(T );
(c) ∀A ∈ Σ,
Pf (A ∩ T )
Pf (T )
=
Pg(A ∩ T )
Pg(T )
Then, T is not F-measurable but is EZ-unambiguous.
The crucial property of the probability measures, Pf and Pg, in the propo-
sition is that, while Pf (T ) 6= Pg(T ), the conditional measures on T coincide.
As an example, take S = [0, 1] equipped with the Lebesgue measure, and let
T = [0, 2/3]. Let l be the density associated to the Lebesgue measure (the
constant function 1), and let m : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be defined by m(s) = 5/4 if




ds and Pg(A) =
R
A
m(s)ds, respectively. Then, Pf and Pg satisfy
the conditions of Proposition 5.
Example 6 The example just given can be elaborated further. Consider a
countable partition of [0, 1] into intervals, and a family {mn}n∈N of densities
such that each mn is constant on the elements of the partition and m0 = 1. One
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can choose the mn’s in such a way that they diﬀer on each and any element of




consider a maxmin decision maker for whom F = co {Pn}n∈N . Then, for such
a decision maker, any element of the given partition of S is EZ-unambiguous
but it is not F-measurable (= unambiguous for Ghirardato, Maccheroni and
Marinacci).
The reader should observe that as far as the decision maker of the proposition
is concerned only with acts with domain T , then he has just one measure space
as all of his priors coincide when conditioned on T . Hence, the proposition says
that a non F-measurable event T ∈ Σ can be EZ-unambiguous if, conditional
on T , the decision maker is an expected utility maximizer.
Next we show that, in the case of a two-dimensional set of priors, these are
the only possibilities. That is, if is F two-dimensional, then an event T ∈ Σ
is EZ-unambiguous if either (i) T is unambiguous in the sense of Ghirardato,
Maccheroni and Marinacci; or (ii) Conditional on T , the decision maker is an
expected utility maximizer. In fact, as Theorem 11 below shows, the situation
is exactly the same in the general case. Nevertheless, we find it useful to begin
with the two-prior case as, in such a case, the intuition is very transparent. In
addition, the proof of Proposition 7 (which will be used in the proof of Theorem
10) makes it clear the crucial role played by the conditional probabilities.
Proposition 7 Let d be a maxmin decision maker (α = 1) with F = co {Pf , Pg}
(co denotes the convex hull). Let Pf , Pg ∈ F and T ∈ Σ be such that
(a’) Pf (T ) > 0; Pg(T ) > 0;
(b’) Property (c) of the previous proposition is not satisfied.
Then, T EZ-unambiguous =⇒ T F-measurable.
The remaining of the paper is devoted to establishing Theorem 10 below,
which, along with Proposition 3, provides a complete characterization of the
unambiguous events in the sense of Epstein and Zhang. The argument leading
to Theorem 10 splits into several lemmata. Two of them, Lemmata 8 and 9
below, are recorded into the main text in order to highlight the main steps in
our construction. A complete proof is in the Appendix. However, as the proof
is rather lengthy, it is probably useful to precede the formal developments with
an informal discussion.
A simple look at the Epstein-Zhang definition (Definition 2, above) reveals
that an event T is EZ-unambiguous if for any two subsets, A and B of T , the
relative likelihood of A with respect to B is invariant with respect to changes
in the (constant) prize assigned on T c. Here, we have put ourselves in the
context of a Multiple Prior model. In such a context, it is immediate to derive
a suﬃcient condition for T to be EZ-unambiguous. In fact, if all the priors rank
(in terms of likelihood) all the subsets of T in exactly the same way, then T
must be EZ-unambiguous. Since we are concerned with the relative likelihood
of subsets of T only, the condition that all the priors rank all the subsets of T
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in exactly the same way translates into a condition about conditional (on T )
probabilities. As shown in [1], in the context of countably additive nonatomic
priors, this condition is that all such conditional probabilities be the same. We
have already seen an example of this in Proposition 5 above.
However, just a moment of thought shows that such a suﬃcient condition can
be relaxed. To see this, consider a maxmin decision maker (α = 1). In such a
model, any act is evaluated according to a single prior, even though such a prior
may vary with the act. Divide the set of priors into two subsets, A and B, in such
a way that all the priors in A rank all the subsets of T in exactly the same way.
Now, if it happens that no prior in B ever intervenes in the evaluation of an act
satisfying the Epstein-Zhang definition, then we can certainly conclude that T
is EZ-unambiguous. That is, a suﬃcient condition for T to be EZ-unambiguous
is that the decision maker’s preferences over acts satisfying the Epstein-Zhang
definition are entirely determined by a subset A ⊂ F and all the priors in A
have the same conditional on T .2
While it is straightforward to see the suﬃciency of the latter condition, it
is, perhaps, not so immediate to see that the condition is also necessary. As a
matter of fact, Lemmata 8 and 9 as well as a big chunk of the proof of Theorem
10 are devoted to this task. The crucial part of the argument is to show that if
T is EZ-unambiguous, then the decision maker’s preferences over acts satisfying
the Epstein-Zhang definition must be determined by a family A whose elements
rank all the subsets of T in exactly the same way. To this end, we proceed,
roughly, as follows. We assume that T is EZ-unambiguous, and suppose that,
by the way of contradiction, that there exist two EZ-acts that are not ranked by
means of the family A. Then, we use the characterization provided by Lemma
9 to construct another pair of EZ-acts which are necessarily ranked accordingly
to the family A. Finally, we use these two pairs to construct a third a pair
of EZ-acts, and show that the ranking of these two acts is not invariant with
respect to changes in the prize on T c.
The first step to establish the necessity of the condition described above is
recorded in Lemma 8 below. The lemma delivers a first necessary condition,
stated as Condition (A) right after the statement of Lemma 8.
Set Vf (α) =
R
S
u[α(s)]dPf . Suppose that there exist Pf , Pg ∈ F such that,
Pf (T ) > 0, Pg(T ) > 0, and the conditional probabilities,
Pf (·∩T )
Pf (T )
and Pg(·∩T )Pg(T ) ,
do not coincide. Then, just like in the proof of the previous proposition, we can
construct two acts, α and β, satisfying the EZ-definition such that
Vg(α) > Vg(β)
Vf (α) < Vf (β)
2The condition discussed in the text does not say that no prior in B ever intervenes in the
evaluation of any act. Even when T is unambiguous, priors in B typically intervene in the
evaluation of acts not satisfying the Epstein-Zhang definition. For instance, bets on a set C
which intersects both T and its complement.
7
Given such acts, define
F1 =
n




Pf˜ ∈ F | Vf˜ (α) < Vf˜ (β)
o








c) , ∀Pg˜ ∈ F1
then, T is EZ-ambiguous.
The lemma says that if there exists at least two measures whose condition-
als on T do not coincide, then T EZ-unambiguous implies that the following
condition is satisfied.
Condition (A) ∀Pf ∈ F2, ∃Pg1 , Pg2 ∈ F1 such that
Pg1(T
c) ≤ Pf (T c) ≤ Pg2(T c)
In other words, the lemma says that Condition (A) is a necessary condition
for T to be EZ-unambiguous.
In general, Condition (A) is not suﬃcient for T to be EZ-unambiguous. The
definition of F1 and F2 in Condition (A) depends on the particular acts that
we constructed in the lemma, and there might exist another pair of acts which
would reveal that T is EZ-ambiguous. The next lemma strengthens Condition
(A) by making sure that this does not happen. From now on, unless otherwise
stated, we are going to restrict attention to events T for which min
Pf∈F
Pf (T ) > 0.
Lemma 9 Let d be a maxmin decision maker. A necessary condition for T to
be EZ-unambiguous is that there exists a set of priors A ⊂ F with the following
properties
(i) ∃Pg1 , Pg2 ∈ A such that for any Pf ∈ B = Ac
Pg1(T
c) ≤ Pf (T c) ≤ Pg2(T c)
and,




That is, if T is EZ-unambiguous, then there must exist a subset of the priors
which (i) provides both the upper and the lower bounds for Pf (T c) (and, hence,
for Pf (T )); and (ii) is such that all the conditional probabilities on T coincide.
Note that the lemma contains as a special case the case of T being F-
measurable, which occurs for Pg1(T
c) = Pg2(T
c). In such a case, Proposition
8
3 guarantees that T is EZ-unambiguous, that is the condition is also suﬃcient.
Note, also, that when specialized to the case of two priors, the lemma provides
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for T to be EZ-unambiguous.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 10, which gives necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for T to be EZ-unambiguous whenever T is not F-measurable.
Theorem 10 Assume that T is not F-measurable. A necessary and suﬃcient
condition for T to be EZ-unambiguous is that there exists a unique maximal (in
the sense of inclusion) set of priors A ⊂ F with the following properties
(i) ∃Pg1 , Pg2 ∈ A such that for any Pf ∈ B = Ac
Pg1(T
c) ≤ Pf (T c) ≤ Pg2(T c)




(iii) Let (α,β) be any two acts satisfying the Epstein-Zhang’s definition. If
for some Pg ∈ A we have Vg(α) > Vg(β), then α Â β.
The necessity of the existence of a subset of the priors, A, satisfying condi-
tions (i) and (ii) had already been established by Lemma 9. With respect to
that, Theorem 10 adds two more conditions. That the maximal set A be unique,
and that property (iii) be satisfied. The latter properties, combined with the
continuity property of preferences we have been studying, implies that the set
A completely determines the decision maker’s ranking over acts satisfying the
EZ-definition. Since, by property (ii), all the priors in A rank those acts in
exactly the same way, and such a ranking is independent of z (the prize that
the acts pay on T c), this implies at once that the condition in the theorem is
also suﬃcient for T to be EZ-unambiguous.
The following theorem restates our conclusions by showing that the gen-
eral case displays the same properties of the two-prior one. That is, T is EZ-
unambiguous if and only if T is either F-measurable, or, conditional on T , the
decision maker is an expected utility maximizer.
Theorem 11 An event T ∈ Σ is EZ-unambiguous if and only if either
(i) T is unambiguous in the sense of Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci;
or
(ii) Conditional on T , the decision maker is an expected utility maximizer.
Let us remark that the ability to account for the latter case is, in our opinion,
a notable feature of the Epstein-Zhang’s definition of unambiguous event.
The next corollary provides an easy operational criterion to establish whether
or not a given event T is EZ-unambiguous.























Corollary 12 An event T ∈ Σ is EZ-unambiguous if and only if either it is
F-measurable, or ∃Pg1 ∈ minT and ∃Pg2 ∈ maxT such that the conditional
probabilities, Pg1 (·∩T )Pg1 (T ) and
Pg2 (·∩T )
Pg2 (T )
, coincide, and if (Pf , Pf 0) is any other pair




In other words, given a maxmin decision maker, it suﬃces to consider the
set of priors which evaluate the bet which pays 1 on T and 0 otherwise, and the
set of priors which evaluate the bet which pays 1 on T c and 0 otherwise. If one
can select two priors, one for each set, such that their conditionals on T coincide
and the requirement in the final part of the corollary is satisfied, then T is EZ-
unambiguous. Otherwise, T is EZ-ambiguous. The final part in the corollary is
necessary to ensure that the (maximal) set of priors having properties (i) and
(ii) as in Theorem 10 be, in fact, unique.
As an immediate corollary to Lemma 9, we also have
Corollary 13 If F contains no two priors whose conditionals on T coincide,
then T EZ-unambiguous ⇐⇒ T F-measurable.
From Proposition 3 and the proof of Theorem 10, we also have
Corollary 14 T is null in the sense of Epstein-Zhang if and only if T is F-
measurable and for any Pf ∈ F , Pf (T ) = 0.
We conclude the paper by stating one more corollary. It is immediate that
our characterization of EZ-unambiguous events holds if we consider α-maxmin
expected utility decision maker with α = 0. Using this observation, we have,
Corollary 15 Theorem 10, and, hence, Theorem 11 hold for any α-maxmin
expected utility decision maker, α ∈ [0, 1] and α 6= 1/2.
The case α = 1/2 is somewhat pathological as already observed in [16], to
which we refer the reader for more detail.
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APPENDIX.
Before proceeding to the proofs of the various statements, we would like to
remind the reader that, in the model of Section 2, the prize space has a convex
structure (see [17]), and that the utility function is determined only up to a
positive aﬃne transformation. We will use these properties several times in
what follows. The main notational conventions are as follows.





the value of the act α, when the prior Pf is used for such evaluation.
Moreover, we set
V (α) = min
Pf∈F
{Vf (α)}Pf∈F
and, for maxmin decision makers (1-maxmin), we have
α % β iff V (α) ≥ V (β)
Now, let α and β be two acts satisfying the first part of Epstein-Zhang’s defin-
ition, and let α0 (β0) be the act obtained from α (β) by changing the prize on
T c from z to z0. In our notation, it is immediate to verify that for any such acts
and for any Pf , Pg ∈ F , we have
Vf (α)− Vf (β) = Vf (α0)− Vf (β0) = [u(y∗)− u(y)][Pf (A)− Pf (B)] (1)
Vg(α)− Vg(β) = Vg(α0)− Vg(β0) = [u(y∗)− u(y)][Pg(A)− Pg(B)]
and
Vf (α)− Vg(α) = u(y∗)[Pf (A)− Pg(A)] + u(y)[Pf (B)− Pg(B)] (2)
+w(h, f, g) + u(z)[Pf (T
c)− Pg(T c)]
where w(h, f, g) is a number that depends on the priors Pf , Pg ∈ F and on
the mapping h in the Epstein-Zhang’s definition. Moreover, we have a similar
expression for α0 by replacing z with z0, and for β and β0 by switching y∗ and
y.
Proof of Proposition 3. If T is F-measurable, then for any Pf , Pg ∈ F ,
Pf (T
c) = Pg(T
c). Hence, equation (2) implies that for any Pf , Pg ∈ F , and for
any acts α,α0,β,β0 satisfying the Epstein-Zhang’s definition, we have
Vf (α)− Vg(α) Q 0 ⇐⇒ Vf (α0)− Vg(α0) Q 0 (3)
and similarly for β and β0.
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Now, suppose that T is EZ-ambiguous.
The relation (3) implies that if α is evaluated by means of a measure Pg,
that is V (α) = Vg(α), then so is α0. Hence, for T to be ambiguous it must be the
case that β is evaluated by means of a measure Pf 6= Pg, that is V (β) = Vf (β),
Pf 6= Pg. For if not, then (by (3)) both β and β0 are evaluated by means of
the same measure Pg, and the reversal of preference cannot occur. Therefore,
suppose that this is the case, and let Pf , Pg be such measures.
Given α, we have three possible cases corresponding to
Vf (α)− Vg(α) Q 0
To begin, suppose that
Vf (α)− Vg(α) ≥ 0 (4)
In such a case, α is evaluated by means of Pg (by the definition of the
functional V ), and, by (3), so is α0. In correspondence of (4), we have either
Vf (β)− Vg(β) ≥ 0
or
Vf (β)− Vg(β) < 0
The first along with (3) implies that both β and β0 are evaluated by means of
Pg as well. This contradicts T ambiguous because, as we have already observed,
in such a case the preference reversal cannot occur. Hence, we are left with the
case Vf (β)− Vg(β) < 0, which (along with (3)) implies that both β and β0 are
evaluated by means of Pf . Then, for T to be ambiguous, it must be the case
that
(i) α % β ⇐⇒ Vg(α) ≥ Vf (β)
(ii) α0 ≺ β0 ⇐⇒ Vg(α0) < Vf (β0)
By (4), (i) implies
0 ≥ Vg(α)− Vf (α) ≥ Vf (β)− Vf (α)
that is
Vf (α)− Vf (β) ≥ 0
which, by (1), implies
Vf (α0)− Vf (β0) ≥ 0
At the same time, (ii) implies
Vg(α
0)− Vf (α0) < Vf (β0)− Vf (α0)
Hence, by using (1) and (2), we have
Vg(α)− Vf (α) = Vg(α0)− Vf (α0) < Vf (β0)− Vf (α0) = Vf (β)− Vf (α) ≤ 0
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that is, Vg(α) < Vf (β), contradicting (i).
This establishes that if Vf (α)− Vg(α) ≥ 0, then T F-measurable implies T
EZ-unambiguous. Along the same lines, the reader can verify the conclusion for
the case Vf (α)− Vg(α) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. T is evidently non F-measurable (by (b)). To
prove that T is unambiguous, it clearly suﬃces to restrict attention to the two
extreme points Pf and Pg.
By property (c) in the statement, ∀A,B ⊂ T , A,B ∈ Σ
Pf (A) > Pf (B) =⇒ Pg(A) > Pg(B)
Hence, by (1)
Vf (α)− Vf (β) = Vf (α0)− Vf (β0) R 0 (5)
⇐⇒
Vg(α)− Vg(β) = Vg(α0)− Vg(β0) R 0
That is, whenever Vf prefers α to β so does Vg, and viceversa.
To show that T is unambiguous, we consider the four possible cases
(a) V (α) = Vg(α); V (β) = Vf (β)
(b) V (α) = Vf (α); V (β) = Vg(β)
(c) V (α) = Vg(α); V (β) = Vg(β)
(d) V (α) = Vf (α); V (β) = Vf (β)
Case (a):
α % β ⇐⇒ Vg(α) ≥ Vf (β)
=⇒ (by def of V ) Vf (α) ≥ Vg(α) ≥ Vf (β)
=⇒ Vf (α) ≥ Vf (β)
=⇒ (by (5)) Vg(α) ≥ Vg(β)
Now, for T to be ambiguous, we must have α0 ≺ β0. Note that it cannot be the
case that α0 and β0 are evaluated by means of the same functional, be it either
Vf or Vg. For, if this were the case, (1) and the preceding would imply α0 % β0.
Hence, we are left with two possibilities:
(a.1) Vg(α
0) < Vf (β0)
=⇒ (by def of V ) Vg(α0) < Vf (β0) ≤ Vg(β0)
=⇒ Vg(α0) < Vg(β0)
which, by (1), contradicts Vg(α) ≥ Vg(β).
(a.2) Vf (α0) < Vg(β0)
=⇒ (by def of V ) Vf (α0) < Vg(β0) ≤ Vf (β0)
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which contradicts Vf (α) ≥ Vf (β).
Similarly, Case (b):
α % β ⇐⇒ Vf (α) ≥ Vg(β)
=⇒ (by def of V ) Vg(α) ≥ Vf (α) ≥ Vg(β)
=⇒ (by (5)) Vf (α) ≥ Vf (β)
Just like before, we need to consider only two cases
(b.1) Vf (α
0) < Vg(β0)
=⇒ Vf (α0) < Vf (β0)
a contradiction.
(b.2) Vg(α
0) < Vf (β0)
=⇒ Vg(α0) < Vg(β0)
again, a contradiction.
We leave to the reader the easy verification of the other two cases.
In order to prove Proposition 7, we are going to show that T non F-
measurable =⇒ T EZ-ambiguous. To do so, we are going to construct a pair
of acts, α and β, satisfying Epstein-Zhang’s definition which reveal that T is
EZ-ambiguous. For this, we need the following
Lemma 16 Under the hypothesis of Proposition 7, ∃A,B ⊂ T , A,B ∈ Σ, such
that
Pf (A) > Pf (B) =⇒ Pg(A) < Pg(B)
Proof of the Lemma. Suppose not, that is ∀A,B ⊂ T , A,B ∈ Σ,
Pf (A) > Pf (B) =⇒ Pg(A) ≥ Pg(B)










The conditional probabilities, Pf (·∩T )Pf (T ) and
Pg(·∩T )
Pg(T )
are both nonatomic, and Propo-
sition 1 in [1] implies that they coincide, thus contradicting assumption (b’).
It is immediate to check that the sets, A and B, whose existence is granted
by the Lemma, can be taken so that A ∩B = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 7. Now, define α and β like in the EZ-definition
by using the events A and B from the previous Lemma. First, pick y∗ and y so
that
Vg(α) > Vg(β) (6)
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which implies
Vf (α) < Vf (β) (=⇒ Vf (α0) < Vf (β0) ) (7)
Next, since T non F-measurable =⇒ Pf (T c) 6= Pg(T c), by (2), we can always
pick z in such a way that both
Vf (α)− Vg(α) > 0
Vf (β)− Vg(β) > 0
(This can be obtained either for a certain choice of the utility function u, which
is unique only to a positive aﬃne transformation, or by oﬀering an act which
pays n times a certain given prize). In such a way, our acts α and β are such
that
V (α) = Vg(α) and V (β) = Vg(β) (8)
By the same argument, we can find a z0 such that both
Vf (α
0)− Vg(α0) < 0
Vf (β
0)− Vg(β0) < 0
That is,
V (α0) = Vf (α0) and V (β0) = Vf (β0) (9)
Now, by (8), both α and β are evaluated by means of g, and (6) implies
α Â β
By (9), both α0 and β0 are evaluated by means of f , and (7) implies
β0 Â α0
that is, T is EZ-ambiguous.
Proof of Lemma 8. By assumption,both F1 and F2 are non empty. Let
α % β. If either (i) or (ii) is satisfied, we can find (see (2)) a z0 such that
Vf¯ (β
0)− Vg˜(β0) < 0 , ∀Pg˜ ∈ F1
which implies that V (β0) = inf
Pl∈F
Vl(β
0) = Vf (β0) for some Pf ∈ F2.
For T to be unambiguous, it must be that
α0 % β0 ⇐⇒ V (α0) ≥ V (β0)
But, by the preceding and the definition of V (·), we have
Vf (α0) ≥ V (α0) ≥ V (β0) = Vf (β0)
which contradicts f ∈ F2.
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Proof of Lemma 9 Let (α,β) be a pair of EZ-acts, and let α % β. Define
F1 =
n




f˜ ∈ F | Vf˜ (α) ≥ Vf˜ (β)
o
From Lemma 8, we know that a necessary condition for T to be EZ-
unambiguous is that ∀Pf ∈ F1, ∃Pg1 , Pg2 ∈ F2 such that
Pg1(T
c) ≤ Pf (T c) ≤ Pg2(T c)
Such a condition depends on the particular pair (α,β) we picked, and does
not exclude that there exists another pair which would reveal that T is
ambiguous. To avoid this, proceed as follows. Restrict attention to F2
and apply Lemma 8 to F2. That is, assume that there exist Pg0 and Pg00
in F2 such that their conditionals on T do not coincide. Then, we can find










Pf˜ ∈ F2 | Vf˜ (α2) < Vf˜ (β2)
o
Lemma 17 A necessary condition for T to be EZ-unambiguous is that ∀Pf ∈
F12 , ∃Pg1 , Pg2 ∈ F3 such that
Pg1(T
c) ≤ Pf (T c) ≤ Pg2(T c)








c) , ∀Pg˜ ∈ F3
then, T is EZ-ambiguous with respect to the family F2. We want to show that
the consideration of the whole family F does not revert this conclusion, thus
proving the claim. To do so, we are going to construct a pair (α2,β2) which
reveals that T is EZ-ambiguous.
Suppose, to fix ideas, that we are in case (i) (case (ii) is, obviously, similar),
and notice that, combined with the fist step in the proof of the proof of Lemma




c). Let Pg ∈ F3. Since Pg¯ ∈ F12 , Pg¯ and
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Pg do not have the same conditionals. Hence, ∃A2, B2 ⊂ T , A2, B2 ∈ Σ, such
that
Pg¯(A2)− Pg¯(B2) > 0 (10)
Pg(A2)− Pg(B2) < 0
Pick y∗2 so that u(y
∗
2) < 0, and pick y2 so that u(y2) = −u(y∗2). Hence, [u(y∗2)−
u(y2)] = 2u(y
∗
2) < 0. Hence, α2 Â β2 when using Pg, and the reverse is true
when using Pg¯ (see (1)). Now, pick h ≡ 0 in the EZ definition. From Lemma 8,
we know that such a pair, (α2,β2), reveals that T is EZ-ambiguous with respect
to the family F2.
We claim that (α2,β2) reveals that T is EZ-ambiguous with respect to the
whole family F .
Under our assumptions, ∃z0 such that
Vg(β
0
2)− Vg¯(β02) > 0 , ∀Pg ∈ F3
Now, suppose that T is not EZ-ambiguous. Then, in such a case, β02 cannot be
evaluated by Pg¯ (this would contradict α02 ≺ β02 for Pg¯). Therefore, there must
exist an Pf ∈ F1 such that
Vf (β
0
2)− Vg¯(β02) < 0
At the beginning of the proof of the Lemma 9, we established that
Pf (T
c) ≤ Pg¯(T c) , ∀Pf ∈ F1
Hence, we have two possibilities.
(i) Pf (T
c) < Pg¯(T
c) , ∀Pf ∈ F1
In such a case, we can define z0 so that
Vf (β
0
2)− Vg¯(β02) > 0 , ∀Pf ∈ F1
which implies that β02 is evaluated by Pg¯, thus showing that T is ambiguous.
Or,
(ii) ∃Pf ∈ F1 : Pf (T c) = Pg¯(T c)
and, for such an f , Vf (α02) ≥ Vf (β02).
By (1), the latter condition is equivalent to
[u(y∗2)− u(y2)][Pf (A2)− Pf (B2)] ≥ 0
which implies (since [u(y∗2)− u(y2)] < 0)
[Pf (A2)− Pf (B2)] ≤ 0
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Combining this with the first of (10), we have
Pg¯(A2)− Pg¯(B2) > 0 ≥ Pf (A2)− Pf (B2)
⇐⇒
Pf (B2)− Pg¯(B2) > Pf (A2)− Pg¯(A2)
Since u(y2) > 0, the latter implies
0 < u(y2)[Pf (B2)− Pg¯(B2)]− u(y2)[Pf (A2)− Pg¯(A2)]
= u(y2)[Pf (B2)− Pg¯(B2)] + u(y∗2)[Pf (A2)− Pg¯(A2)]
= ( by (2)) Vf (β
0
2)− Vg¯(β02)
that is, no such a Pf can evaluate β
0
2. In other words, β
0
2 is either evaluated
by Pg¯ or by some Pf˜ such that Vf˜ (α2) < Vf˜ (β2), thus contradicting T EZ-
unambiguous.
This completes the proof of Lemma 17.
Proof of Lemma 9 (continued). We can now complete the proof of
Lemma 9. It follows from Lemma 17 that, if T is EZ-unambiguous, by consid-
ering an EZ pair (α2,β2) like the one above, we can find a set F3 ⊆ F2 such
that ∀Pf ∈ F12 ∪ F1, ∃Pg1 , Pg2 ∈ F3 such that
Pg1(T
c) ≤ Pf (T c) ≤ Pg2(T c)
The set F12 = F2\F3 can be empty, which occurs if there exists no Pf˜ ∈ F2




Pg ∈ F2, are the same, and the lemma is proven.
If F12 is non empty, then F3 ⊂ F2. Set B3 = F1 ∪ F12 , and notice that
F3 ∩ B3 = ∅, and F3 ∪ B3 = F .
Now that we are at F3, we can continue the construction so to obtain the
chain Fn+1 ⊆ Fn ⊆ · · · (and the chain Bn+1 ⊇ Bn ⊇ · · ·). It is clear, that the
process stops only when we reach a set A such that for any EZ-pair, (α,β) we
have Vg(α) ≥ Vg(β) for all Pg ∈ A. As we have seen (in the proof of Proposition
5) this occurs if and only if all the conditionals, Pg(·∩T )Pg(T ) , Pg ∈ A, are the same.
If such a set fails the condition
∃Pg1 , Pg2 ∈ A such that for any Pf ∈ B
Pg1(T
c) ≤ Pf (T c) ≤ Pg2(T c)
then, by Lemma 8, T is EZ-ambiguous. This completes the proof of Lemma
9.
Remark 18 If in the above proof A can be taken to be a singleton, then Pg1(T c) =
Pg2(T
c) and T is also F-measurable. In such a case, by Proposition 3, the con-
dition is also suﬃcient.
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Proof of Theorem 10. The necessity of the existence of a set of priors
A satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) was already established in Lemma 9. Now,
we establish the necessity of condition (iii). We proceed by contradiction, and
divide the proof in several claims.
Let (α,β) be any two acts satisfying the Epstein-Zhang’s definition. It is
useful to think of such acts as functions of z, the prize that they both pay if the
realized state is in T c. So suppose that while for some Pg ∈ A (and, hence, for all
Pg ∈ A) Vg(α(z)) > Vg(β(z)), we have β(z) % α(z) (hence, V (β(z)) ≥ V (α(z))).
Below, after Claim 11, we show that this leads to a contradiction.
Since by assumption T is EZ-unambiguous, we must have that ∀z0, β(z0) %
α(z0) [as β(z) % α(z) =⇒ β(z0) % α(z0)].
CLAIM 1: ∀z0,∃Pf 0 ∈ B = F\A such that
(a) Vf 0 (β(z0)) ≥ Vf 0(α(z0))
(b) V (α(z0)) = Vf 0(α(z0))
(c) Vf 0(α(z0)) < Vg(α(z0)), ∀Pg ∈ A.
Proof of CLAIM 1. If (b) is not true, then for some Pg˜ ∈ A
Vg˜(β(z0)) ≥ V (β(z0)) ≥ V (α(z0)) = Vg˜(α(z0))
thus contradicting Pg˜ ∈ A.
If (b) is satisfied, but (a) is not, we have
Vf 0(β(z0)) ≥ V (β(z0)) ≥ V (α(z0)) = Vf 0(α(z0)) > Vf 0(β(z0))
which is again a contradiction.
Finally, if (c) is not satisfied, we have
V (β(z0)) ≥ V (α(z0)) = Vg(α(z0)) > Vg(β(z0))
again a contradiction.







Proof of CLAIM 2. Suppose that either condition is not satisfied. Say the
first, that is ∃ε > 0 such that
Pf (T
c) ≥ Pg1(T c) + ε , ∀Pf ∈ B
Then, from equation (2), ∃z0 such that ∀z : u(z) ≥ u(z0)
Vg1(α(z)) ≤ Vf (α(z)) , ∀Pf ∈ B
This implies a contradiction as for such a z0
V (β(z0)) ≥ V (α(z0)) = Vg1(α(z0)) > Vg1(β(z0))
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Let
B¯ε = {Pf ∈ B | Pf (T c) > Pg2(T c)− ε}
B
¯ε
= {Pf ∈ B | Pf (T c) < Pg1(T c) + ε}
CLAIM 3. ∀ε > 0, ∃Pfˆ ∈B¯ε and ∃Pfˇ ∈ B¯ε and two prizes, z1 and z2, suchthat
(d) Vfˆ (α(z1)) = V (α(z1)) ; Vfˇ (α(z2)) = V (α(z2))
(e) Vfˆ (β(z1)) ≥ Vfˆ (α(z1)) ; Vfˇ (β(z2)) ≥ Vfˇ (α(z2))
Proof of CLAIM 3. Fix an ε > 0, and consider the sets
B1 = {Pf ∈ B | Pf (T c) ≥ Pg1(T c) + ε}
B2 = {Pf ∈ B | Pf (T c) ≤ Pg2(T c)− ε}
By equation (2), ∃z1 such that ∀z : u(z) ≥ u(z1)
Vf (α(z1))− Vg1(α(z1)) ≥ 0 , ∀Pf ∈ B1
and ∃z2 such that ∀z : u(z) ≤ u(z2)
Vf (α(z1))− Vg2(α(z1)) ≥ 0 , ∀Pf ∈ B2
Since T EZ-unambiguous and β(z) % α(z) imply both β(z1) % α(z1) and
β(z2) % α(z2), there must exist (by CLAIM 1) Pfˆ , Pfˇ ∈ B such that
V (α(z1)) = Vfˆ (α(z1)) < Vg1(α(z1))
V (α(z2)) = Vfˇ (α(z2)) < Vg2(α(z2))
and, again by CLAIM 1, Pfˆ and Pfˇ must have the property (e) in the statement.
Finally, by combining the last four inequalities, we have
Vfˆ (α(z1)) < Vf (α(z1)) , ∀Pf ∈ B1
Vfˇ (α(z2)) < Vf (α(z2)) , ∀Pf ∈ B2
Hence,
Pfˆ ∈ B\B1 ⇐⇒ Pfˆ ∈ Bε
Pfˇ ∈ B\B2 =⇒ Pfˇ ∈ B¯ε
Summarizing,
Let (α(z),β(z)) be such that Vg(α(z)) > Vg(β(z)), for some Pg ∈ A. Suppose
that β(z) % α(z). Then, T EZ-unambiguous implies that ∀ε > 0 there exist
Pfˆ ∈B¯ε and Pfˇ ∈ B¯ε such that
(e) Vfˆ (β(z)) ≥ Vfˆ (α(z)) ; Vfˇ (β(z)) ≥ Vfˇ (α(z))
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(f) There exists a prize k such that ∀z : u(z) ≥ u(k)
Vfˆ (α(z)) < Vg1(α(z)) ≤ Vf (α(z)) , ∀Pf : Pf (T
c) ≥ Pg1(T c) + ε
and ∀z : u(z) ≤ −u(k)
Vfˇ (α(z)) < Vg2(α(z)) ≤ Vf (α(z)) , ∀Pf : Pf (T c) ≤ Pg2(T c)− ε
CLAIM 4: There exists an EZ-act, ι = ι(z), defined by using the same events
as in α and β above, such that ∀ε > 0
(g) ∃Pfˆ ∈B¯ε and a prize z˜
0 such that ∀z : u(z) ≥ u(z˜0)
Vfˆ (ι(z)) < Vf (ι(z)) , ∀Pf : Pf ∈ B\B¯ε (11)
(h) ∃Pfˇ ∈ B¯ε and a prize z˜00 such that ∀z : u(z) ≤ u(z˜00)
Vfˇ (ι(z)) < Vf (ι(z)) , ∀Pf : Pf ∈ B\B¯ε (12)
(i) Moreover, both Pfˆ and Pfˇ can be taken so that property (e) is satisfied.
Proof of CLAIM 4. By using the same events which define α and β, define
a new act, ι = ι(z), as follows
ι(z) = (x,−x, 0, z)
where the notation means that ι pays x on A, −x on B (or, rather, a prize
whose utility is −u(x)), a fixed prize whose utility is 0 on T\(A ∪B) and z on
T c.
Moreover, take x so that u(x) < 0.
Given ε > 0, pick Pfˆ ∈ B¯ε/2. By CLAIM 3, Pfˆ can be taken so that property
(e) is satisfied. ∀Pf : Pf ∈ B\B¯ε, we have
Pf (T




and (see equation (2)), we can find a z˜0 such that ∀z : u(z) ≥ u(z˜0)
Vfˆ (ι(z)) < Vf (ι(z)) , ∀Pf : Pf ∈ B\B¯ε
Similarly, for the other part.
CLAIM 5: Let ι(z) be the act defined in the previous claim. ∃z0, z00 such
that ∀Pfˆ , Pfˇ satisfying the properties of CLAIM 4, we have
(j) ∀z : u(z) ≥ u(z0)
Vg1(ι(z)) < Vfˆ (ι(z))
(k) ∀z : u(z) ≤ u(z00)
Vg2(ι(z)) < Vfˇ (ι(z))
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Proof of CLAIM 5. By assumption for some Pg ∈ A, and, hence, for all
Pg ∈ A (see equation (1))
Vg(α(z))− Vg(β(z)) = [u(y∗)− u(y)][Pg(A)− Pg(B)] > 0
Without loss, assume [u(y∗) − u(y)] > 0. Hence, by equation (1), for all the
Pfˆ ’s satisfying the properties of CLAIM 4, we must have
[Pg(A)− Pg(B)] > 0 ≥ [Pfˆ (A)− Pfˆ (B)] (13)
and, similarly, for Pfˇ in the place of Pfˆ .
Next, observe that (see equation (2))
Vfˇ (ι(z
00))− Vg2(ι(z00)) = u(x)
n




By inequality (13) and u(x) < 0, the first addendum on the RHS is > 0. Hence,
for any z such that u(z) ≤ 0, we have
Vfˇ (ι(z)) > Vg2(ι(z))
Similarly, for any z such that u(z) ≥ 0, we have
Vfˆ (ι(z)) > Vg1(ι(z))
By combining the inequalities in CLAIM 5 with (11) and (12), we have that
∀ε > 0, there exist prizes z0 and z00 such that
(l) ∀z : u(z) ≥ u(z0)
Vg1(ι(z)) < Vfˆ (ι(z)) ≤ Vf (ι(z))
for all Pfˆ satisfing the properties of CLAIM 4, and ∀Pf : Pf ∈ B\B¯ε.
(m) ∀z : u(z) ≤ u(z00)
Vg2(ι(z)) < Vfˇ (ι(z)) ≤ Vf (ι(z))
for all Pfˇ satisfying the properties of CLAIM 4, and ∀Pf : Pf ∈ B\B¯ε.
Now, observe that (l) implies that ∀z : u(z) ≥ u(z0), ι(z) is evaluated either
by Vg1 or by some Vγ1 ∈ B¯ε. By (l) and inequality (13), such a Vγ1 ∈ B¯ε hasnecessarily the property that
Vγ1(α(z)) > Vγ1(β(z))
as for u(z) ≥ 0, Vγ1(ι(z)) ≤ Vg1(ι(z)) requires
u(x)
©




which implies [Pγ1(A)− Pγ1(B)] > 0.






In the first case, we can take z0 so that ∀z : u(z) ≥ u(z0)
(n) Vγ1(ι(z)) > Vg1(ι(z))
In the second case, we can take z0 so that ∀z : u(z) ≥ u(z0)
(o) Vγ1(α(z)) < Vf (α(z)) , ∀Pf : Pf ∈ B\B¯ε
Similarly, (m) implies that ∀z : u(z) ≤ u(z00), ι(z) is evaluated either by Vg2
or by some Vγ2 ∈ B¯ε with the property that
Vγ2(α(z)) > Vγ2(β(z))
and we can take z00 in such a way that either








Let us denote by Vδ1 the functional which evaluates ι(z) for z : u(z) ≥ u(z0),
with the understanding that Vδ1 is either Vg1 or Vγ1 . The notation Vδ2 has
analogous meaning.
CLAIM 6: There exists a prize z∗ such that, for all Pfˆ ’s satisfying CLAIM
4 and for all Pf ∈ B\B¯ε, all the following inequalities hold for z : u(z) ≥ u(z
∗)
Vfˆ (α(z)) < Vδ1(α(z)) ≤ Vf (α(z))
Vδ1(ι(z)) < Vfˆ (ι(z)) ≤ Vf (ι(z))
Proof of CLAIM 6. It follows at once from property (f) following CLAIM 3
and properties (l), (n) and (o) following CLAIM 5.
In particular, we have
V (α(z∗)) = Vfˆ (α(z
∗))
for some Pfˆ satisfying CLAIM 4, and
V (ι(z∗)) = Vδ1(ι(z
∗))
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where Vδ1 is such that
Vδ1(α(z)) > Vδ1(β(z))
Now, define a new act, θa(z), which is a convex combination of α(z) and
ι(z). That is, θa(z) = aα(z) + (1− a)ι(z), a ∈ (0, 1). Observe that, since α(z)
and ι(z) use the same events, θa(z) is an EZ-act which uses the same events.
In addition, denote by θ˘a(z) [˘ι(z)] the act obtained from θa(z) [ι(z)] by
switching the prizes between A and B. Notice that θ˘a(z) = aβ(z)+ (1− a)˘ι(z).
By using equation (1), one sees that
Vg(θa(z))− Vg(θ˘a(z)) = [a(u(y∗)− u(y)) + (1− a)2u(x)][Pg(A)− Pg(B)] (14)
and we have analogous expressions for Pfˆ or Pfˇ replacing Pg.
Recall (proofs of CLAIMs 4 and 5) that (u(y∗)−u(y)) > 0 and that u(x) < 0.
Take x such that [a(u(y∗)− u(y)) + (1− a)2u(x)] > 0 (while still u(x) < 0).




u(y∗)− u(y)− 2u(x) = a
∗
and observe that a∗ > 0 and that a∗ can be made arbitrarily small as x is matter
of our own choice. Then, by (13)
Vg(θa(z)) > Vg(θ˘a(z)) (15)
and, again by inequality (13), we have that
Vfˆ (θa(z)) ≤ Vfˆ (θ˘a(z)) (16)
Vfˇ (θa(z)) ≤ Vfˇ (θ˘a(z))
for all Pfˆ ,Pfˇ satisfying CLAIM 4.
CLAIM 7: ∀a ∈ (0, 1)
Vfˆ (θa(z
∗)) ≤ Vf (θa(z∗))
for all Pfˆ ’s satisfying CLAIM 4 and for all Pf ∈ B\B¯ε.Proof of CLAIM 7. Since, for each Pf , Vf is linear, this follows at once from
CLAIM 6.
CLAIM 8: ∃a1 ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀a ∈ [0, a1] and for all Pfˆ ’s satisfying
CLAIM 4
Vδ1(θa(z
∗)) ≤ Vfˆ (θa(z
∗))
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Proof of CLAIM 8.
Vδ1(θa(z




∗) + (1− a)ι(z∗)) ≤ Vfˆ (aα(z
∗) + (1− a)ι(z∗))
⇐⇒
aVδ1(α(z
∗)) + (1− a)Vδ1(ι(z∗)) ≤ aVfˆ (α(z
∗)) + (1− a)Vfˆ (ι(z
∗))
Hence, the statement follows immediately from CLAIM 6.
CLAIM 9: ∀a ∈ (a∗, a1), θa(z∗) Â θ˘a(z∗).
Proof of CLAIM 9. By CLAIM 8, Vδ1(θa(z
∗)) ≤ Vfˆ (θa(z∗)) for any Pfˆ
satisfying CLAIM 4. Hence, if V (θa(z∗)) = Vδ(θa(z∗)) for some Pδ ∈ F , we
necessarily have Vδ(α(z∗)) > Vδ(β(z∗)). In fact, it is clear that Pδ cannot be in
B\B
¯ε
as, if this were the case, we could always redefine z∗ in a way that Vδ does
not evaluate θa(z∗). Hence, it must be that Pδ ∈ B¯ε. Moreover, it cannot bethat Vδ(α(z∗)) ≤ Vδ(β(z∗)) because in such a case Pδ would satisfy CLAIM 4,
thus contradicting CLAIM 8. We, then, conclude that Vδ(α(z∗)) > Vδ(β(z∗)),
and, hence, [Pδ(A) − Pδ(B)] > 0. The latter implies Vδ(θa(z∗)) > Vδ(θ˘a(z∗))





∗)) (by a > a∗)
≥ V (θ˘a(z∗))
CLAIM 10: ∃z¯ such that ∀z : u(z) ≤ u(z¯) all the following inequalities are
true
Vfˇ (θ˘a(z)) < Vf (θ˘a(z))
Vδ2(θ˘a(z)) < Vf (θ˘a(z))
for all Pfˇ satisfying CLAIM 4 and for all Pf ∈ B\B¯ε.
Proof of CLAIM 10. The first follows from the fact that the Pfˇ ’s satisfying
CLAIM 4 are in B¯ε/2. The second follows from equation (2) and from the
properties (p) and (q) following CLAIM 5.
All the properties we have shown so far hold ∀ε > 0. Next, we choose ε so
that it belongs to a certain neighborhood of 0.
For any z and for any Pfˇ satisfying CLAIM 4 (see equation (2)), we have
Vfˇ (˘ι(z))− Vg2 (˘ι(z)) = −u(x)
n





By (13) and u(x) < 0, the first addendum is < 0. Hence, the whole expres-
sion is< 0 if either Pfˇ (T
c) = Pg2(T
c), or if u(z) >




c)− Pg2(T c)] < 0.
Since, by CLAIM 2, ∀ε > 0 there exists a Pfˇ satisfying all the above prop-
erties, we can now choose ε in such a way that for some u(z∗∗) ≤ u(z¯), we have
u(z∗∗) >
u(x){[Pfˇ (A)−Pfˇ (B)]−[Pg2 (A)−Pg2 (B)]}
[Pfˇ (T
c)−Pg2 (T c)]
. At a such z∗∗, we have
Vfˇ (˘ι(z
∗∗))− Vg2 (˘ι(z∗∗)) < 0 (17)
Clearly, the same is true for Vγ2 in the place of Vg2 .
CLAIM 11: ∃a2 ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀a ∈ [0, a2]
Vfˇ (θ˘a(z
∗∗)) ≤ Vδ2(θ˘a(z∗∗))

















Hence, the statement follows from (17).
Notice that, by (17), the inequality in CLAIM 11 holds for any Vδ such that
Vδ(α(z∗∗)) > Vδ(β(z∗∗)). Combined with CLAIM 10, this implies
V (θ˘a(z∗∗)) = Vfˇ (θ˘a(z
∗∗))
for some Pfˇ satisfying CLAIM 4.
Now, with all the above facts available, we can complete the proof that if
T is EZ-unambiguous, then the set of priors A satisfying conditions (i) and (ii)
has to satisfy condition (iii), also.
Recall that a∗ can be made arbitrarily small. This guarantees that (a∗, a1)∩
[0, a2] is nonempty. Take a ∈ (a∗, a1) ∩ [0, a2]. Then, CLAIM 11 implies
V (θ˘a(z∗∗)) = Vfˇ (θ˘a(z
∗∗))
≥ Vfˇ (θa(z∗∗)) (by inequality (16))
≥ V (θa(z∗∗))
Hence, θ˘a(z∗∗) % θa(z∗∗).
Since, by assumption T is EZ-unambiguous, θ˘a(z∗∗) % θa(z∗∗) =⇒ θ˘a(z∗) %
θa(z∗), but this contradicts CLAIM 9.
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Now, we are going to show that if T is EZ-unambiguous, then there exists
a unique maximal (in the sense of inclusion) set of priors, A, satisfying (i), (ii)
and (iii).
Suppose that there exist two subsets, A1 and A2, with A1 6= A2 satisfying
(i) to (iii), and assume that they are both maximal. If A1 and A2 are associated
to the same conditional probability on T , then A1 ∪A2 satisfies (i) to (iii), thus
contradicting the maximality of A1 and A2. Hence, assume that there exist
Pg ∈ A1 and Pf ∈ A2 such that their conditionals on T do not coincide. Then,
(by Lemma 16) there exists an EZ-pair, (α,β), such that Vg(α) > Vg(β) and
Vf (α) < Vf (β). But, since both A1 and A2 have property (iii), we have
Vg(α) > Vg(β) =⇒ α Â β
Vf (α) < Vf (β) =⇒ β Â α
a contradiction.
We now show the suﬃciency of the condition.
Let A be the maximal set of priors satisfying (i) to (iii). We already know
that all the Pg ∈ A produce the same ranking for all EZ-acts, and that if Pg ∈ A
and Vg(α) > Vg(β), then α Â β. Hence, since ∀z0, Vg(α) > Vg(β) =⇒ Vg(α0) >
Vg(β
0), we have α Â β =⇒ α0 Â β0.
To complete the proof, we have only to show that
Vg(α) = Vg(β) =⇒ α ∼ β
Suppose not. For instance,
Vg(α) = Vg(β) but α ≺ β
Consider a family {γn}n∈N of EZ-acts defined by
γn = (1− an)α+ an[sup
s∈S
α(s) + x]
where {an}n∈N ⊂ [0, 1], an 6= 0 and an → 0, x is a constant act such that
u(x) = 0 and sup
s∈S
α(s) is defined by means of the (induced) preference relation
over the prize space.
For any n and any Pg ∈ A, we have Vg(γn) > Vg(α), which implies (by (iii))
γn Â α. Moreover, since Vg(α) = Vg(β), we also have Vg(γn) > Vg(β), which
implies (again by (iii)) γn Â β, ∀n ∈ N .
Continuity of the class of preferences we have studying (see [17]) along with
γn Â β, ∀n ∈ N , then imply α = lim
an→0
γn % β, which contradicts α ≺ β.
Hence, A determines the ranking of all (T -based) EZ-acts, thus implying
that T is EZ-unambiguous.
In the next proof, we refer to acts satisfying the EZ-definition as to T -based
EZ-acts.
28
Proof of Theorem 11. By Theorem 10, if T is EZ-unambiguous, either
T is F-measurable or the conditions in Theorem 10 are satisfied. In the latter
case, the family A of Theorem 10 determines the ranking of all T -based EZ-acts.
EZ-acts conditional on T can be identified to a subset of the T -based EZ-acts,
those for which u(z) ≡ 0. As such, the ordering of the EZ-acts conditional on
T is entirely determined by the family A. Such an ordering corresponds to the
one defined by the conditional probabilities associated to the members of A,
which are all the same. Finally, notice that the class of EZ-acts conditional on
T contains all the simple acts. Hence, by using the utility function, it can be
embedded in the space of all simple functions S → R. Then, the statement
follows by applying the Monotone Convergence Theorem.
Suﬃciency follows immediately by using the above reasoning from Theorem
10 and Proposition 3.
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